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 Abstract: This article recounts the intellectual history of the UNDP’s Human Development 
Index. It begins with the early history of welfare economics and follows this field through three 
successive revolutions in thought culminating in the theory of human development. The first 
section traces this history from the origins of economic “utility” theory to Sen’s human 
capabilities approach. The second section is a chronicle of past and present measures of social 
welfare used in the fields of economics and development, including national income and a 
variety of composite measures up to and including HDI.  
Key words: human development; well-being; human development index; economic history of 
thought; social welfare measurement 
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Introduction 
 
In 1990, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) transformed the landscape of 
development theory, measurement, and policy with the publication of its first annual Human 
Development Report (HDR) and the introduction of the Human Development Index. HDR 1990 
presented the concept of “human development” as progress towards greater human well-being, 
and provided country-level data for a wide range of well-being indicators. The UNDP’s 
establishment of the HDR expanded both the availability of measurement and comparison tools 
used by governments, NGOs, and researchers, and our common understanding of development 
itself.  
The Human Development Index, or HDI, embodies Amartya Sen’s “capabilities” approach to 
understanding human well-being, which emphasizes the importance of ends (like a decent 
standard of living) over means (like income per capita) (Sen 1985). Key capabilities are 
instrumentalized in HDI by the inclusion of proxies for three important ends of development: 
access to health, education, and goods. Empowered by these, and other, capabilities, individuals 
can achieve their desired state of being.  
HDI has been the centerpiece of the HDRs for 17 years, and the latest edition, HDR 2006, 
includes HDI rankings for 177 countries. In HDI, component indices for life expectancy, 
literacy, school enrollment, and income are combined together into a single index that can be 
used to compare the level of human well-being among countries or to monitor one country’s 
progress over time. HDI provides an alternative to the still common practice of evaluating a 
country’s progress in development based on per capita national income. 
What follows is the story of the development of the HDI, beginning with the early intellectual 
history of welfare economics and following this field through three successive revolutions in 
thought culminating in the theory of human development. In the first section, I trace this history 
from the origins of economic “utility” theory to Sen’s human capabilities approach. The second 
section is a chronicle of past and present measures of social welfare used in the fields of 
economics and development, including national income and a variety of composite measures up 
to and including HDI. Since HDI’s first introduction in 1990, many scholars have offered 
critiques of its underlying data and its method of calculation. In many cases, the UNDP has 
responded by improving HDI based on these critiques. In the third, and final, section of this 
chapter I summarize these critiques and the UNDP’s adjustments to HDI over time. 
Human Well-Being: A History of Thought 
In neo-classical economics “utility” is a term that has come to mean an individual’s mental state 
of satisfaction, with the proviso that levels of satisfaction or utility cannot be compared across 
individuals. It is a concept that is simultaneously too broad and too narrow. Almost anything can 
be seen to have and give utility, albeit with diminishing returns. While its reach is broad, the 
usefulness of the “utility” concept as deployed in neo-classical thought suffers from some severe 
limitations. In the absence of inter-personal comparability, the utility of individuals cannot be 
aggregated in order to consider social welfare, nor can it be compared in order to consider 
distribution. 
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While a theory of well-being that can address neither aggregate welfare nor inequality seems of 
little practical or conceptual use, this modern definition of utility has nonetheless been the 
dominant measure of human welfare used in mainstream economic theory since the 1930s. As 
measurement has become increasingly central to the field of economics, the accepted metric for 
social or aggregate welfare has been defined implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) in terms of 
money, or, more specifically, as national income per capita (ironically, a practice that violates 
neo-classical utility theory, as will be explored below). Yet modern theorists including Martha 
Nussbaum, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen have opened our eyes to a world of concepts of social 
welfare unbound by the rules of neo-classical economics. The history of thought leading up to 
Sen’s capabilities approach to human welfare is the topic of this section.  
The origins of welfare economics 
The Western thought that provides the basis for most modern economists’ understanding of 
human well-being can be traced back as far as Aristotle, who viewed well-being as something 
generated by our actions and not our belongings: 
Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does 
well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The 
characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have 
defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical 
wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, 
accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. 
(Aristotle, 350 B.C.E.) 
Dominant European concepts of well-being changed over time from this Aristolean idea to the 
medieval metric of heavenly rewards and punishments determining our earthly well-being, to 
Calvinist predetermination, and finally to the scientific aestheticism of the Renaissance, which 
lasted until the dawn of Utilitarian philosophy in the 18th century (Segal 1991). 
Jeremy Bentham’s (1789: Ch.1) Introduction to the Principles of Morals was not the first, but is 
the best remembered discussion of the philosophy of Utilitarianism, in which human behavior is 
described as motivated by pleasure and pain – their net satisfaction being “utility.” Society’s 
well-being was the sum of these utilities, such that an ethical course of action was that which led 
to “the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” This formulation of social welfare was meant 
to be both egalitarian and individualistic: each person’s utility was counted equally and each 
person got to determine what was his or her own level of satisfaction (Ackerman 1997a). In 
theory, utility could be summed across individuals to determine “social welfare,” but 
utilitarianism did not offer any practical way to actually measure either individual or societal 
well-being. Bentham also posited what would eventually come to be known as the diminishing 
marginal utility of goods, and, by extension, income or wealth: the idea being that each new unit 
of anything adds to your utility a little bit less than the last one.  
Amartya Sen (2000a) points to a fierce opposition to pluralism of ideas as a defining 
characteristic of Utilitarianism. Utilitarians insisted on the importance of having a single measure 
of human well-being, as opposed to different and non-commensurable elements. In contrast, in 
The Standard of Living, Sen (1987b: 1) defends a pluralistic understanding of well-being: 
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There are many fundamentally different ways of seeing the quality of living, and quite a few of 
them have some immediate plausibility. You could be well off, without being well. You could be 
well, without being able to lead the life you wanted. You could have got the life you wanted, 
without being happy. You could be happy, without having much freedom. You could have a good 
deal of freedom, without achieving much. We can go on.  
Sen (2000a) views Benthamite utilitarianism as a rhetorical tactic that successfully cleared the 
intellectual arena of any serious opponents to utility. If there could be only one measure of well-
being, then the struggle to have that measure be net satisfaction was not a very difficult one.  
Utilitarianism receded in the early 19th century, until its revival by John Stuart Mill’s 
Utilitarianism (1861). Mill’s vision of utilitarianism differed in some respects from that of 
Bentham and other early proponents. He allowed for a hierarchy of different qualities or types of 
pleasure, recognized the importance of social influences on individual attitudes, and 
acknowledged that individuals are not always the best judges of their own interests (Ackerman 
1997a).  
The Marginalist Revolution 
The most direct antecedents of today’s neo-classical economists were called the Material or 
Marginalist Welfare School; these theorists preserved the basic precepts of Utilitarianism, but 
used new mathematical tools to make their arguments. At the center of their economic theory 
were two related ideas. First, that the goal of individuals was to maximize utility, and, second, a 
formalization of Bentham’s idea that utility was concave, or diminishing on the margin. Versions 
of these ideas were published independently by Willam Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, Leon 
Walras, and Alfred Marshal starting in the 1870s (Ackerman 1997a; Cooter and Rappoport 
1984). Of the marginalists, Marshall (1890, Book 3, Chapter 3) is the best known for promoting 
the idea of “satiable wants”: 
There is an endless variety of wants, but there is a limit to each separate want. This familiar and 
fundamental tendency of human nature may be stated in the law of satiable wants or of 
diminishing utility thus: The total utility of a thing to anyone (that is, the total pleasure or other 
benefit it yields him) increases with every increase in his stock of it, but not as fast as his stock 
increases. If his stock of it increases at a uniform rate the benefit derived from it increases at a 
diminishing rate. In other words, the additional benefit which a person derives from a given 
increase of his stock of a thing, diminishes with every increase in the stock that he already has.  
By the 1890s the marginalists dominated British economic thought. This school of thought, 
perhaps envious of the new mathematical models developed in the field of physics in the 1860s, 
is responsible for increasing the mathematical complexity of economic analysis. Its members 
also changed the focus of economics, away from the centrality of economic growth emphasized 
by Adam Smith (and by future 20th century macroeconomists) and the distribution among classes 
emphasized by David Ricardo and Karl Marx, and towards the analysis of constrained 
maximization or allocation problems that necessitated the assumption of fixed resources 
(Ackerman 1997a).1 Interestingly, interpersonal comparisons were assumed to be impossible by 
proponents of the Marginalist Welfare School, but these comparisons were conducted 
nonetheless between large groups, like the rich and the poor (Cooter and Rappoport 1984). 
 5
Following the work of Arthur Cecil Pigou, the marginalists restricted their analysis to the 
necessities of life, using money as a “measuring stick.” Focusing on the most material aspects of 
welfare led to the insight that additional income was more useful to the poor than the rich. Pigou 
and Marshal, in particular, were explicitly in favor of income redistribution because it would lead 
to more material wants being satisfied. Vilfredo Pareto – who was against redistribution– 
clarified the by now murky waters of utility by pointing out that there were really two concepts 
of utility, not one. Usefulness was one form of utility. Ophelimity, or subjective desire, was the 
other. The Marginalist Welfare School was concerned only with the material wants of the former 
(Cooter and Rappoport 1984; Ackerman 1997b). 
The Ordinalist Revolution 
In 1932 the Marginalist Welfare School was attacked by British economist Lionel Robbins for 
having too narrow a focus on usefulness utility (e.g., bread) to the exclusion of ophelimity utility 
(e.g., opera tickets).2 Unlike material necessities, ophelimity cannot be observed or compared 
either between individuals or on average between groups of people. Robbins called for the 
rejection of all interpersonal comparisons of utility arguing that cardinal measurement and 
interpersonal comparisons could never capture the unobservable utility or satisfaction of others, 
and that it, therefore, could not be demonstrated or assumed that the marginal utility of income 
for the poor is greater than the marginal utility of income for the rich. The success of Robbins’ 
rejection of cardinal measures of utility led to the so-called “Ordinalist Revolution” in 
economics, and the birth of neo-classical economics as we know it today (Robbins 1932; Cooter 
and Rappoport 1984).  
The ordinalists noticed that if one were to combine the utilitarian concept of social welfare 
(defined as the sum of individual welfares) with another important marginalist assumption, 
diminishing marginal utility of income, the logical outcome is a very subversive result: Social 
welfare reaches its maximum when income was distributed equally across the population. 
Robbins (1932: 137, 141) took pains to reject this conclusion:  
The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility implies that the more one has of anything the less one 
values additional units thereof. Therefore, it is said, the more real income one has, the less one 
values additional units of income. Therefore, the marginal utility of a rich man’s income is less 
than the marginal utility of a poor man’s income. Therefore, if transfers are made, and these 
transfers do not appreciably affect productivity, total utility will be increased…[This claim] 
rests upon an extension of the conception of diminishing marginal utility into a field in which it 
is entirely illegitimate…[and] begs the great metaphysical question of the scientific 
comparability of different individual experiences…Hence the extension of the Law of 
Diminishing Marginal Utility, postulated in the propositions we are examining, is illegitimate. 
And the arguments based upon it therefore are lacking in scientific foundation. Recognition of 
this no doubt involves a substantial curtailment of the claims of much of what now assumes the 
status of scientific generalisation in current discussions of applied Economics. The conception of 
diminishing relative utility (the convexity downwards of the indifference curve) does not justify 
the inference that transferences from the rich to the poor will increase total 
satisfaction…Interesting as a development of an ethical postulate, it does not at all follow from 
the positive assumptions of pure theory. It is simply the accidental deposit of the historical 
association of English Economics with Utilitarianism: and both the utilitarian postulates from 
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which it derives and the analytical Economics with which it has been associated will be the 
better and the more convincing if this is clearly recognised.  
If income were both concave in welfare and unequally distributed, you could always increase 
social welfare by redistributing some income from the rich to the poor. Ian Little (1955: 11-14) 
elaborated on Robbins critique and argued that individual satisfactions cannot be summed up, 
that satisfaction is never comparable among different individuals, and that the field of welfare 
economics up until that time had been – to its detriment – entirely normative. The utilitarian 
definition of social welfare was gradually replaced in welfare economics by the idea of “Pareto 
optimality.”  
In the concept of Pareto optimality, individual welfare is still utility, but social welfare is defined 
by the absence or presence of Pareto optimality (a situation in which no one can be made better 
off without making someone else worse off). In reality, this is a somewhat empty concept of 
social welfare since a very wide array of distributional situations can be Pareto optimal, and the 
only real opportunities for “Pareto Improvements” – when someone is made better off while 
noone is made worse off – occur when there are unclaimed or wasted resources. In On Ethics 
and Economics, Amartya Sen (1987a: 33-34) calls this redefinition of social well-being the 
narrowing of welfare economics: “In the small box to which welfare economics got confined, 
with Pareto optimality as the only criterion of judgement, and self-seeking behaviour as the only 
basis of economic choice, the scope for saying something interesting in welfare economics 
became exceedingly small.”  
In modern usage, the applied economics of social welfare has taken the form of cost/benefit 
analysis (CBA), a common tool for making decisions about whether a project will improve social 
welfare (and should therefore be carried out) or will reduce social welfare (and should not be 
carried out). According to CBA, if the net present value of the future stream of costs and benefits 
of a project is positive, we should carry out the project, but if the net present value is negative we 
should not carry out the project. Abstracting from the vexing question of discount rates (by 
which future costs and benefits are translated into present values), this means that any addition to 
the size of the “economic pie” is good, regardless of the distribution of costs and benefits (in that 
changes that improve the welfare of some while diminishing that of others somehow qualify as 
social welfare improvements). This decision rule runs counter to that of Pareto optimality, but it 
is similar to Bentham’s social welfare as the sum of all individual welfares, with the difference 
that what is being summed is money rather than utility. Thus in applied neo-classical welfare 
economics, inter-personal comparability re-enters through the back door, while the diminishing 
marginal utility of income drops out of sight. The practice of adding up costs and benefits, and 
concluding that any positive net present value is good overlooks problems of unequal 
distribution: who gets the benefits and who pays the costs?  
Connecting CBA back to ordinalist economic theory takes a blind eye and a few, difficult to 
justify, conceptual leaps. The conceptual leap by which neo-classical economics bridges applied 
cost-benefit analysis to theoretical welfare economics is the “compensation test.” If a project 
results in a positive net present value, then the economic pie has gotten bigger. With a bigger pie 
potentially we could make everyone better off, or at least we could make some people better off 
while making no one worse off: This is a “potential Pareto improvement.” 
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The compensation test, introduced by Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, is a method for 
determining whether or not there has been a potential Pareto improvement (Cooter and 
Rappoport 1984; Jackson 1992). Those who receive net benefits (the winners) could in principle 
compensate those who bear net costs (the losers) and still be better off. When net present value is 
positive, if I get all of the benefits but I have to pay back everyone who suffers costs, I can pay 
all the losers and still have a positive benefit left for myself. Of course, this fails to bring solace 
to the losers unless they are compensated in practice. As Sen (2000b: 947) so devastatingly put 
it: 
If compensations are actually paid, then of course we do not need the comparison criterion since 
the actual outcome already includes the paid compensations and can be judged without 
reference to compensation tests…On the other hand if compensations are not paid, it is not at all 
clear in what sense it can be said that this is a social improvement (“Don’t worry, my dear 
loser, we can compensate you fully, and the fact that we don’t have the slightest intention of 
actually paying the compensation makes no difference; it is merely a difference in distribution”). 
The compensation tests are either redundant or unconvincing.  
Winners do not actually have to compensate losers in CBA – there just has to be the potential. 
But when the costs accrue to one group and the benefits accrue to another, can it be said 
unequivocally that a positive net benefit is an increase to society’s well-being? 
CBA marries Pareto optimality to the compensation test at the micro-economic level. At the 
macro-economic level, Pareto optimality combined with the compensation test leads to income 
per capita as a measure of development. The use of income per capita as a measure of social 
welfare requires the same conceptual leap that CBA makes on the micro-economic level. Unless 
one assumes that there is a constant marginal utility of income, maximizing the sum of dollars is 
not the same as maximizing the sum of utility. But with a bigger dollar pie, it would be possible 
to distribute the additional dollars such that no one has less – a potential Pareto improvement that 
evades the problem posed by diminishing marginal utility of income. The practice of conflating 
income per capita with social welfare is, of course, subject to the same criticism that Sen levels 
against CBA.3
The Humanist Revolution 
In A Theory of Justice (1971), philosopher John Rawls’ definition of individual well-being was 
the possession of “social primary goods” or things that rational humans need or desire – a 
concept similar to utility – but his method of aggregating social well-being across individuals 
was revolutionary. Rawls’ two principles of justice are, first, that, “Each person has an equal 
right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for all.” (Sen 1992: 75) This is not unlike Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous 
statement that, “The right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose begins.” Rawls’ 
second principle is that, “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, 
they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society.” (Sen 1992: 75; Rawls 1971)4
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Rawls (1971: 152-3) went on to explain that these principles taken together form what he called 
the “maximin” rule for choice under uncertainty: 
[T]he two principles are those a person would choose for the design of a society in which his 
enemy is to assign him his place. The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst 
possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the 
worst outcome of the others. The persons in the original position do not, of course, assume that 
their initial place in society is decided by a malevolent opponent. As I note below, they should 
not reason from false premises. The veil of ignorance does not violate this idea, since an 
absence of information is not misinformation.  
A Rawlsian notion of society’s well-being, therefore, is one in which social welfare is said to be 
equal to the well-being of society’s least well-off member. 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum are together credited with the origination of the 
“capabilities” approach to human well-being based on Rawlsian philosophy (Pattanaik 1994). 
Like Aristotle, Sen and Nussbaum focused attention on what human beings can do, instead of on 
what they have. Moving the discussion away from utility and towards “capabilities” allowed Sen 
and Nussbaum to distinguish means (like money) from ends (like well-being or freedom) 
(Crocker 1992, 1995). 
While Rawls limited his analysis of social welfare to the “social primary goods” that rational 
humans need or desire, and “negative freedoms” that involve the absence of interference, Sen 
and Nussbaum expanded on this base to include “positive freedoms” as well, like freedom from 
being constrained by poverty or a lack of education (Sen 1987a; Rawls 1971; Crocker 1992, 
1995).5 For neo-classical economists, well-being is individual utility, a mental state. For Sen and 
Nussbaum, both well-being and agency – or freedom – are important, and utility is not adequate 
as a measure of well-being (Crocker 1992, 1995). In Inequality Reexamined, Sen (1992: 6) 
makes this critique: 
Welfarism in general and utilitarianism in particular see value, ultimately, only in individual 
utility, which is defined in terms of some mental characteristics, such as pleasure, happiness, or 
desire. This is a restrictive approach to taking note of individual advantage in two distinctive 
ways: (1) it ignores freedom and concentrates only on achievements, and (2) it ignores 
achievements other than those reflected in one of these mental metrics.  
Capabilities are the abilities to do certain things or to achieve desired states of being. They are 
empowerment, the power to obtain what you desire, utilize what you obtain in the way that you 
desire, and be who you want to be. Goods, on the other hand, are merely things that you possess. 
Capabilities allow you to use goods in ways that are meaningful to you. Sen uses a further term, 
“functionings,” to refer to the capabilities that a person actually uses or participates in. 
Capabilities, then, are the full set of functionings that are feasible for a given person. For 
example, with one capabilities set, fasting may be the only choice; with another set, fasting may 
be one of many choices. In addition, capabilities can have intrinsic value by adding worthwhile 
options or positive freedoms to one’s life (Sen 1999; Crocker 1992, 1995). 
While Sen declines to list capabilities or functionings because of what he considers to be a need 
for a democratic process to determine such a list, Nussbaum (2000) has proposed a list of ten 
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capabilities: (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; 
(5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; and (10) control 
over one’s environment.6
Nussbaum also discusses the ways in which our ability to convert a commodity into a capability 
depends on personal, social, and environmental conversion factors. Ingrid Robeyns (2005: 99) 
gives the example of access to a bicycle:  
If a person is disabled, or in a bad physical condition, or has never learned to cycle, then the 
bicycle will be of limited help to enable the functioning of mobility…If there are no paved roads 
or if a government or the dominant societal culture imposes a social or legal norm that women 
are not allowed to cycle without being accompanied by a male family member, then it becomes 
much more difficult or even impossible to use the good to enable the functioning.  
The capabilities approach draws on a rich history of economic and philosophical thought 
regarding social welfare. Sen and Nussbaum’s work stands out from that of their predecessors 
because of inclusion of human beings’ role as agents of their own well-being, and because of the 
centrality of human agency both as an end in itself, and as a means to other important capabilities 
or freedoms. Sen and Nussbaum’s humanist revolution is a critique of theoretical neo-classical 
welfare economics, and they go beyond arguing that income per capita and CBA are inadequate 
measures of social welfare to refute Pareto optimality’s standing as a basis of making value 
judgments. The UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) is an attempt to build on the insights 
of the humanist revolution, in effect developing an applied measure of social welfare as a 
correlate to this new theoretical welfare economics. Just as income per capita and CBA were the 
progeny of the ordinalist revolution, HDI was born of the humanist revolution.  
A History of the Measurement of Social Well-Being 
In India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1995: 9) 
describe the origins of the field development economics shortly after World War II and note that 
from its beginnings this field had “an overarching preoccupation with the growth of real income 
per capita.” The most common measure of aggregate human well-being is now – as it has been 
for over 50 years – national income, usually expressed as per capita gross national product 
(GNP) or per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Criticisms of national income as a metric for 
social welfare have a long history and are by no means confined to economists (see Sánchez 
2000). 
Measures of national income add up all of the goods and services exchanged on the market in a 
particular country in a given year. One of the principal architects of national income accounting 
was Nobel Laureate Simon Kuznets, who began work on the United States’ income accounting 
in 1932. In 1947, a student of Kuznets, Milton Gilbert, then chief of the National Income 
Division of the United States’ Department of Commerce, published the first description of the 
particular form of national income accounts called “gross national product” (Waring 1988).  
GNP is the sum of all consumption, investment, and government spending by a country’s 
nationals, whether within the national territory or not. In 1953, the United Nations published “A 
System of Statistical Tables” that gives clear, precise instructions for constructing national 
 10
income accounts; these tables, with some modifications, are still the standard for national income 
accounts today (Waring 1988). Since the 1990s, GNP has been supplanted by GDP as the most 
common definition of national income (Ackerman et al. 1997: 347). GDP measures all 
consumption, investment, and government spending within a country, plus exports minus 
imports, regardless of the citizenship of the consumers or investors.  
Many authors have noted conceptual problems with using GDP or GNP per capita as a measure 
of human well-being.7 Briefly, national income accounts: 1) only register monetary exchanges; 
2) equate goods with commodities that are not “goods” but “bads,” like nuclear weapons, the 
production of which tends to lower social welfare; 3) count both addictions and cures, or “anti-
bads,” like the costs of cleaning up petroleum spills; 4) treat natural resources as free and 
limitless; 5) place no value on leisure-time; 6) ignore freedom and human rights; and (7) ignore 
the distribution of income within the society (Hicks and Streeten 1979; UNDP 1990).  
Growth versus development 
Closely associated with the use of national income accounts to measure well-being is the 
conflation of economic growth (as measured by the change in GDP) with development or 
progress. Hicks and Streeten (1979) point out two common assumptions made by proponents of 
this measure: First, economic growth will automatically “trickle-down” and spread its benefits 
across society; second, when economic growth fails to trickle-down and instead causes income 
disparities, governments will step in to remedy the situation. By one or both routes, growth in per 
capita national income will reduce poverty. As Hicks and Streeten (1979: 567) comment, neither 
assumption had, at the time of their writing, proved true: “Highly concentrated and unequal 
growth was observed in some countries for prolonged periods, so that there was no universal 
tendency for growth to spread. Nor did governments always show signs of correcting gross 
inequalities.” 
Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974: 38) state that:  
It is not sufficient that we should pay more attention to distribution or to the incomes of the poor 
within the existing framework of policy analysis. Rather, it is necessary to reformulate the 
framework itself so as to incorporate an explicit analysis of the processes by which the incomes 
of the poor are generated and the policy instruments by which these processes can be affected. 
They distinguish between GDP growth and development, and propose an index of economic 
performance that sorts individuals into groups by their income or asset level, and then weights 
the importance of each group’s economic growth before aggregating for a measure of social 
welfare. Ahluwalia and Chenery discuss several different potential weighting schemes, from 
setting the weight of the poorest group at one and all other groups at zero (which would result in 
a measure consistent with Rawls’ idea of social welfare), to giving each individual’s income 
growth an equal weight (i.e., a one percent increase counts the same for all), to weighting the 
groups’ importance to society’s well-being by its share of total income. They point out that this 
last approach is equivalent to using GDP growth as a measure of the change in social welfare. 
In Hunger and Public Action, Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1989: 183, 226) address this issue 
by distinguishing between growth-mediated and support-led government intervention. The 
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growth-mediated strategy is, in some respects, a “trickle-down” policy. The idea is that greater 
affluence not only improves private incomes but also creates a better basis with which to pay for 
social services; the goal, then, is to increase GDP in order to increase the country’s tax base and 
potential social service provision. In contrast, support-led strategies prioritize not increasing a 
country’s GDP, but directly providing social services – including guarantees of income, income 
transfers, healthcare, and education – regardless of the level of GDP.  
The strategies of growth-mediated and support-led development are contrasted to what Drèze 
and Sen (1989: 188) call “unaimed opulence” – an indiscriminate pursuit of economic 
expansion:  
A particularly crude version of [unaimed opulence], which is in fact not uncommon, consists of 
attempting to maximize economic growth without paying any direct attention to the 
transformation of greater opulence into better living conditions. Unaimed opulence, in general, 
is a roundabout, undependable, and wasteful way of improving the living standards of the poor.  
In effect, unaimed opulence is a lack of any sort of public policy to address equity; the result of 
this lack can be rampant economic growth coupled with widespread poverty, illiteracy, ill health, 
child labor, crime, and starvation (Drèze and Sen 1995: 34). According to Drèze and Sen (1989: 
180-1), there is no inevitable connection between GDP and the quality of life. The effect of GDP 
growth on poverty and inequality is always and everywhere mediated by public action.  
The HDRs have carried this message – that national income is insufficient to measure human 
well-being for a wide variety of reasons – into the 1990s and beyond:  
People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an 
enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. This may appear to be 
a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the accumulation of 
commodities and financial wealth. (UNDP 1990: 9) 
Some authors have disagreed with the UNDP’s claim that estimates of national income have 
been the only measure of aggregate social welfare taken seriously since the 1950s or 1960s 
(UNDP 1990). For example, Srinivasan (1994: 238) states that, “In fact, income was never even 
the primary, let along the sole, measure of development, not only in the minds of economists but, 
more importantly, among policymakers.” Srinivasan cites a variety of other measures that were 
in use in the 1950s. Similarly Rao (1991: 1453) calls the HDI “old wine in a new bottle,” stating 
that before development was supplanted by economic growth in the 1960s, there was a more 
comprehensive view of human well-being. 
It is not, however, the existence of other measures that is in dispute, but rather the overwhelming 
dominance of national income as a measure of well-being. An early United Nations (1954: 12) 
report gives further evidence both of this dominance, and of a long tradition of criticism of 
national income as a measure of development:  
The amount of money spent on consumption is often regarded as the measure of the level of 
living. The Committee did not agree with this view. Monetary expenditure to a large extent 
indicates personal wants and preferences. If an individual receives an increased income, and if 
prices, etc., remain the same, it must be assumed, according to the monetary approach, that his 
level of living has risen. But if he spends the additionally money on certain types of products or 
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activities injurious to his health, we may…come to the conclusion that his level of living has not 
gone up or is even lower than before. Similarly, two persons expending the same amount of 
money on themselves may…have quite different levels of living.  
Predecessors of the HDI 
Many scholars and development agencies have attempted to create a broader measure of human 
well-being by combining indicators that shed light on both means and ends of social progress. 
Obstacles to the construction of such an index have included the lack of any objective standards 
both for what components should and should not be included, and for the appropriate way to 
combine the chosen indicators (Hicks and Streeten 1979).  
One of the earliest of these attempts was conducted by the United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development (UNRISD). In 1966, the UNRISD published a 20-country study of a “level 
of living index” that had categories for physical needs (nutrition, shelter, and health); cultural 
needs (education, leisure, and security); and higher needs (measured as income above a 
threshold). The UNRISD released a second study in 1972, this time of a “Development Index” 
with nine economic and nine social characteristics (McGranahan 1972; Hicks and Streeten 
1979). In 1973, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
published a report in which six social variables were used to form a “predicted GNP per capita 
index” for 82 developing countries. In 1975, the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
ranked 140 countries by adding the ranks together for seven indicators: two social (literacy and 
life expectancy) and five economic (energy, the manufacturing share of GDP, the manufacturing 
share of exports, employment outside of agriculture, and number of telephones) (OECD/DAC 
1973; UN-ECOSOC 1975; Hicks and Streeten 1979). 
Beginning in 1976, the International Labor Organization began publishing its work on the “basic 
needs” approach to development. Basic needs included an adequate level of both consumption 
and essential services, like health care or primary education. The specific indicators used to 
measure basic needs have varied over time, although in later studies by Paul Streeten (1981) and 
Frances Stewart (1985) an effort was made to reduce the number of variables by establishing 
which had the highest levels of correlation with one another. Both studies came to the conclusion 
that life expectancy could stand as a proxy for all basic needs. 
In 1979, M.D. Morris of the Overseas Development Council released the Physical Quality of 
Life Index (PQLI) with the objective of measuring whether a minimum set of human needs was 
being met by the world’s poorest people: “To the extent that development planners within poor 
countries and aid dispensers in donor countries now focus more directly on projects that 
emphasize distribution of benefits, they need not only new planning strategies but also additional 
measurement systems.” (2) The PQLI combined infant mortality, life expectancy at age one year, 
and basic literacy, transforming each indicator into an index by comparing the level to a fixed 
range of possible levels, and then taking the average of the three components. Morris (1979: 49) 
explained that, “The extremes that define each index affect the placing of countries on that 
particular index as well as on the composite index.” The PQLI also presented sub-national 
measures by gender and by region, where data were available. 
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Later attempts to construct a measure of social welfare include Camp and Speidel’s (1987) 
International Human Suffering Index, which combined ten measures including income, infant 
mortality, nutrition, adult literacy, and personal freedom (Srinivasan 1994). Also Slottje’s (1991) 
study of 130 countries, which appears to have been written before the release of the HDR 1990, 
drew on the capabilities approach by constructing a composite of 20 indicators, arguing that 
Morris’ three components were insufficient to capture the quality of life.  
Mahbub ul Haq and the HDI  
For the first time, we have begun to acknowledge – still with a curious reluctance – that in many 
societies GNP can increase while human lives shrivel. – Mahbub ul Haq (1999: 4) 
Drawing heavily on the capabilities approach to human welfare, Mahbub ul Haq’s “human 
development” project of the UNDP has been to define a new conceptualization of well-being and 
to make available measures of well-being based on that new idea. The first HDR (UNDP 1990: 
9) declared that the means of development have obscured its ends because of two primary 
factors: 
First, national income figures, useful though they are for many purposes, do not reveal the 
composition of income or the real beneficiaries. Second, people often value achievements that do 
not show up at all, or not immediately, in higher measured income or growth figures: better 
nutrition and health services, greater access to knowledge, more secure livelihoods, better 
working conditions, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, and a 
sense of participating in the economic, cultural and political activities of their communities. Of 
course, people also want higher incomes as one of their options. But income is not the sum total 
of human life.  
The human development process is one of enlarging people’s choices. It focuses on three 
essential components: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and “access to resources needed for a 
decent standard of living” because, “If these essential choices are not available, many other 
opportunities remain inaccessible.”(UNDP 1990) In the words of Paul Streeten (1994: 232): 
Human development puts people back at center stage, after decades in which a maze of technical 
concepts had obscured this fundamental vision. This is not to say that technical analysis should 
be abandoned. Far from it. But we should never lose sight of the ultimate purpose of the 
exercise, to treat men and women as ends, to improve the human condition, to enlarge people’s 
choices.  
Sen, who was one of the principal consultants on HDR 1990, wrote that at first he did not see the 
point of a crude composite index like the HDI, especially against the backdrop of the wealth of 
information that the UNDP was planning to include in the report. Haq replied, “We need a 
measure of the same level of vulgarity as GNP – just one number – but a measure that is not as 
blind to social aspects of human lives as GNP is.”8 Sen (2000a: 17) has since described human 
development as “an illuminating concept that serves to integrate a variety of concerns about the 
lives of people and their well-being and freedom,” and affirmed that the HDR has served the 
increasing demands for pluralistic measures of development from both scholars and activists. 
On the success of this mission to supplant GDP, Haq has said: 
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Only 30 years ago, it would have been heresy to challenge the economic growth school’s tacit 
assumption that the purpose of development is to increase national income. Today, it is widely 
accepted that the real purpose of development is to enlarge choices in all fields – economic, 
political and cultural. Seeking increases in income is one of the many choices people make, but 
it is not the only one. (Haq, as quoted in Sánchez 2000: 9) 
In 2005, as in 1990, the HDI is the heart of the HDRs. HDI is a measure of human development 
that combines proxies for three important human capabilities: health, education, and a decent 
standard of living. Health (H) is represented by life expectancy (LE), education by literacy (LIT) 
and school enrollment (ENR) (the literacy and school enrollment indices are combined in 
weighted average as the education (E) index), and standard of living by GDP per capita (Y). The 
value for each these components is transformed into an index using a normalization formula in 
which the actual value is compared to a stylized range of values across all countries: 
 
LE i – 25 years (1) H-Indexi =  85 years – 25 years
 
LIT i – 0% (2) LIT-Indexi =  100% – 0%
 
ENR i – 0%(3) ENR-Indexi =  100% – 0%
 
(4) E-Indexi =  2/3(LIT-Indexi) + 1/3(ENR-Indexi)
 
ln(Y i) – ln($100) (5)Y-Indexi =  ln($40,000) – ln($100)
 
The per capita GDPs used in the income index are in U.S. dollars and are purchasing power 
parity (PPP) adjusted to eliminate differences in national price levels. In addition, income is 
capped at $40,000, and natural logarithms are calculated for the actual, minimum, and maximum 
values in order to account for the diminishing marginal utility of income. The practical upshot of 
the logarithmic transformation is this: increasing GDP per capita by $100 in a country where the 
average income is only $500 has a much greater impact on the standard of living as measured in 
HDI than the same $100 increase in a country where the average income is $5,000 or $50,000.  
In the final step for calculating HDI, the health, education, and income indices are averaged 
together, with each one given an equal weight: 
(6) HDIi  =  (H-Index i + E-Index i + Y-Index i)/3 
 
The calculations used in the HDI have changed over the years and what is described above is the 
most recent formula, which has remained unchanged since 1999. Figure 1 below gives a history 
of HDI formulations. 9
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Critiques of HDI 
Sen and Haq have not been the only ones to point out that one of the primary attributes of HDI is 
its ability to draw attention away from GDP and towards a wider concept of human development. 
Some scholars have derided the HDI on precisely these grounds. For example, Castles (1998: 
832) writes that the HDR’s  “dominant position in the global market for information on the social 
and economic world owes little to its intrinsic qualities and much to the packaging and 
promotional efforts of its multinational sponsor.” Streeten (1994: 235), on the other hand, takes a 
positive view of these same qualities, “Yet, such indexes are useful in focusing attention and 
simplifying the problem. They have a stronger impact on the mind and draw public attention 
more powerfully than a long list of many indicators combined with a qualitative discussion.”  
Year Human Development Index 
1990 • Component Index = (maximum-actual)/(maximum-minimum) 
• HDI = 1 - average of component indices 
• Ranked from worst (#1) to best (#130) 
• Maximum and minimum for current year 
• Education Index = adult literacy only 
• Income Index = log10(PPP GDP/capita); with the average poverty line for nine 
OECD countries as maximum 
1991 • Ranked from best (#1) to worst (#160) 
• Education Index = adult literacy and mean years of school enrollment 
• Income Index = Atkinson formula = y* + 2(GDPi - y*)½ + 3(GDPi - 2y*)⅓ +…; 
threshold y* is the average poverty line for nine OECD countries 
1994 • Component Index = (actual-min)/(max-min) 
• HDI = average of component indices 
• Fixed maximum and minimum (LE: 25/85 yrs; LIT: 0%/100%; ENR: 0%/100%; 
Y: $200/$40,000) 
1995 • Education Index = adult literacy and combined gross school enrollment 
• Income minimum changed to $100 
1999 • Income Index = natural log(PPP GDP/capita) up to $40,000 
Source: UNDP 1990 to 2005. 
Figure Error! No text of specified style in document..1: History of Changes to the HDI 
 
Over the years many economists and other scholars have critiqued the HDI for this among many 
other reasons. Srinivasan (1994: 241) sums up the viewpoints of several of his colleagues 
writing:  
[T]he HDI is conceptually weak and empirically unsound, involving serious problems of 
noncomparability over time and space, measurement errors, and biases. Meaningful inferences 
about the process of development and performance as well as policy implications could hardly 
be drawn from variations in HDI. 
Srinivasan goes on to criticize the HDRs, in general, as being ill-informed and unsound. 
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This section summarizes the literature critiquing the HDI, changes in the HDI formula proposed 
by its critics, and the UNDP’s responses to these critiques. The critiques and proposed 
alternatives fall into five main categories: poor data, incorrect choice of indicators, various 
problems with the HDI’s formula in general, incorrect specification of income in particular, and 
redundancy.  
Poor data  
One category of critiques of the HDI addresses what some suggest is a poor quality of data, 
particularly in terms of the thoroughness of data collection and the frequency of measurement 
errors. Srinivasan (1994) and Ogwang (1994) point out that the census data used to calculate the 
HDI are unreliable because of the infrequency of census data collection, the possibility of 
inaccurate reporting, and a lack of complete coverage within countries. Srinivasan (1994) and 
Aturupane et al. (1994) each discuss a variety of concerns with measurement errors, including 
differing definitions – especially of literacy – from country to country, and the absence of a 
measure of school quality or length of school year in the school enrollment index. The UNDP 
has strived to improve the HDR’s data over the last 15 years, although more improvement is, of 
course, still possible. HDR 1996 (UNDP 1996: 133) states that, “A major goal of the Report is to 
encourage national governments, international bodies and policy-makers to participate in 
improving statistical indicators of human development.”  
Wrong indicators 
A second set of critiques concerns the selection of components included in the composite HDI. 
This critique takes two, closely related, forms: first, that important indicators are missing from 
the HDI, and second, that those indicators included in the HDI are the wrong ones. The latter 
critique will be discussed below in the section regarding overall misspecification of the index. 
The former critique – that variables important to explaining human well-being have been left out 
– refers to indicators related to four main areas: the extent of civil and political liberties; 
distribution of income, access to health care, and access to educational opportunities; 
environmental impacts on well-being and access to natural resources; and further educational 
measures to include both stocks and flows.10  
While the UNDP has not added any new indices to the three original components, it has 
responded to the first three of these concerns by focusing an edition of the HDR on each topic: 
HDR 1991 contains a Human Freedom Index; HDR 1992 focuses on inequality and includes an 
Income-Inequality-Adjusted HDI; and HDR 1998 addresses over-consumption and 
sustainability. The UNDP also responded to critiques regarding the HDI’s original education 
index, which was based solely on adult literacy. This measure was changed, first by adding mean 
school years in HDR 1991 to give a greater weight to current educational policies, and then by 
replacing mean school years with combined gross enrollment in HDR 1995 because of difficulty 
obtaining data for mean school years for all countries. 
Wrong specification 
It has also been suggested that the formula used to calculate the HDI is arbitrary, unjustifiable, 
and incorrect.11 The HDI’s components are combined using a simple, unweighted mean – a 
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method which has been likened to “adding apples and oranges.” (Hopkins 1991: 1471) Sager and 
Najam (1998: 251) write that “the scheme of arithmetic averaging of the dimensions runs counter 
to the notion of their being essential and, therefore, non-substitutable.”  
One key critique of the HDI’s specification regards relative deprivation, or “moving goal 
posts.”12 From 1990 to 1993 the HDI had minimum and maximum values for all three 
components based on variable criteria, like the actual minimum and maximum in the current 
year, or an average threshold value, as with income. Calculating the component indices using 
minimum and maximum values that change each year both makes it difficult to compare between 
years and, as noted by Kelley (1991: 319), “assumes that little or no progress in human 
development can be made by the developed countries.” In 1994, the UNDP began using fixed 
goal posts to calculate HDI: 25 and 85 years for life expectancy, 0 and 100 percent for adult 
literacy, 0 and 15 years for mean school years, and $200 and $40,000 for GDP per capita. When 
combined gross enrollment replaced mean school years in HDR 1995, it was assigned “goals 
posts” of 0 and 100 percent. Also in HDR 1995, the lower bound for GDP per capita was 
changed to $100. These same fixed goals posts, as assigned in 1994 and updated in 1995, are still 
used today. 
The second major critique leveled at the formulation of the HDI regards the equal weights 
assigned to the three components. Biswas and Caliendo (2001) call this weighting procedure 
“unsettling” and remark that “to the extent that one component index has a different variance 
than another equal weights seem unsatisfactory. Greater variability in one component index 
relative to another represents information that is unused or ignored in simple averaging.” In HDR 
1991 (UNDP 1991: 88), the UNDP justifies its weighting procedure by explaining that the three 
indices are equally important, and, “All three of the HDI components thus deserve equal 
weight.” Many critics have found this explanation lacking. Chowdhury (1991: 126), for example, 
writes that: 13
It may be pointed out that there is an interesting paradox here. If a composite index is sensitive 
to weights, then one must be able to offer a solid defense of one’s chosen weights if the index is 
to be taken seriously. On the other hand, if the index is relatively robust, this would imply that 
the components are correlated, so that aggregation is pointless – any component would carry 
pretty much the same information. 
Streeten (1994), on the other hand, defends use of a simple average stating that it is a good tool 
for focusing on decreasing gaps between countries, and that there is a political appeal to a simple 
method.14
Some scholars have focused on the relative weight of income as compared to life expectancy and 
education.15 According to Kelley (1991: 319), “[I]t might be argued that the capacity to choose 
among many dimensions of human development accorded by expanded income in particular 
merits giving a relatively higher weight to this indicator.”  
It is also important to note that the choice of the range of all three indicators affects the weight of 
the respective variable in the composite index (Kelley 1991).16 In order to avoid a bias resulting 
from the choice of endpoints, Panigrahi and Sivramkrishna (2002) suggest standardizing each 
indicator before combining them.17 The problem of implicit weights concealed by the explicit 
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equal weights is discussed more fully in the section below on misspecification of the income 
indicator.18
Other possible weighting schemes include, according to Slottje (1991), establishing weights by: a 
social welfare function, a priori assumptions, regression coefficients, principal-components 
analysis (PCA), and the Borda method.19 The PCA method, which uses the variance of linear 
combinations of the components to determine potential weights, has been tested by several 
researchers. In the Borda method, ranks for the three components are added together and the 
sums are then re-ranked, with these new ranks becoming the composite index’s values.20  Other 
methods not on Slottje’s list include using a geometric mean (UNDP 1991); using D2 statistics to 
calculate a composite index based on the standardized actual values and the standardized 
targeted values of the three components (Mazumdar 2003); and multiplying the three indices, so 
that HDI will be more sensitive to low values in any one index (Sager and Najam 1998). In 
addition, Paul (1996) offers a Modified-HDI that raises each index to a given power before 
taking the arithmetic mean, so that the higher the power, the greater difference between 
countries’ index values. 
Noorkbakhsh (1998b) compares several different methods of arriving at a composite index using 
the HDI data, including the arithmetic mean, PCA, and Borda methods, and finds that the ranks 
for all methods are very similar, which provides a justification for the current HDI specification. 
Similarly, Biswas and Caliendo (2001) use the PCA method to arrive at nearly equal weights for 
the three components – Life Expectancy Index 34 percent, Education Index 34 percent; GDP 
Index 32 percent – and conclude that: 
Despite the simplistic methodology, it appears that the HDI is a good method of combining the 
component indexes and should be viewed, perhaps, with less skepticism…[L]ittle is lost in the 
simplistic method, and much is gained in terms of straightforwardness. Indeed, while the 
strength of the HDI appears to lie in its easy comprehension, the weights used therein are 
consistent with multivariate techniques that generate weights optimally. 
HDR 1993 also reports the results of PCA studies and concludes that these support equal 
weighting. 
Wrong measure of income per capita 
The fourth type of critique is about specification of the income component of HDI. The original 
measure was the shortfall of the base 10 logarithm of GDP compared to a maximum and 
minimum income value: 
log10 ($4861) – log10 (GDP i)(7) GDP-Indexi1990 =  log10 ($4861) – log10 ($220) 
 
where HDI was equal to one minus the average of the three indices, and the maximum and 
minimum values were chosen to equal the mean of the official poverty lines in nine OECD 
countries,21 $4861, and the GDP per capita of the country with the lowest average income, Zaire 
with $220, respectively (UNDP 1990). 
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HDR 1990 (UNDP 1990: 12) explained the use of logarithms in calculating the GDP Index in 
this way:  
A further consideration is that the indicator should reflect the diminishing returns to 
transforming income into human capabilities. In other words, people do not need excessive 
financial resources to ensure a decent living. This aspect was taken into account by using the 
logarithm of real GDP per capita for the income indicator. 
More recently Haq (1999: 49) also addressed the importance of adjusting income for diminishing 
returns:  
The HDI method thus emphasized sufficiency rather than satiety. It does not treat income as a 
means but reinterprets it in terms of the ends it serves. That is why, for example, the high income 
of the industrial countries is de-emphasized in the HDI and an overwhelming weight is given to 
the social progress they have achieved with this income. 
Income is treated differently from the other variables because of the long-accepted practice in the 
field of economics of assuming that increases in income, and the goods and services that can be 
purchased with increased income, have a diminishing marginal effect on human well-being. 
Some critics of the HDI have raised the question of why life expectancy and literacy are not 
transformed to take their diminishing returns into account.22 Noorbakhsh (1998a: 519) make this 
case in regards to the returns to literacy:  
It may be argued that the principle of diminishing returns also applies to educational 
attainments. To put it in a positive context, under similar conditions the early “units” of 
educational attainments to a country should be of much higher value than the last ones. In the 
context of policy-making in a country with 30% adult literacy, improvements in literacy are of 
far greater urgency than the same for a country with 90% adult literacy. On the other hand, it 
may be also argued that the value of the returns to increasing levels of educational attainment 
can be influenced in both directions, decreasing or increasing, by other factors such as the level 
of industrialization, capital accumulation and productivity.  
Hicks and Streeten (1979: 571) addressed these concerns noting that for other social indicators, 
“skewness at the upper end is more limited than it is for income per head…There is practically 
no limit to how much income a man can receive, but the maximum life span is limited.” They 
also point out that some social indicators, like life expectancy, capture the costs of both national 
affluence – for example, heart disease – and destitution.  
The original specification for income in the HDI was critiqued both on the grounds of its income 
cap, and for the use of logs, for example, by Rao (1991: 1455): “Since people do not compare 
‘logs’ of incomes, it is better to simply use the absolute levels.”23 In 1991, the UNDP changed to 
a new specification of income using what is referred to as a modified Atkinson concave 
transformation:  
1  (8) f(Y) = 1 - ε * Y
1- ε
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where ε is extent of diminishing marginal returns to income, set for particular ranges of income 
such that: for 0 to y*, ε = 0; for y* to 2y*, ε = ½; for 2y* to 3y*, ε = ⅔, etc., where y* was the 
average poverty line for nine OECD countries (UNDP 1991). In general,  
(9) Y Indexi1991 = y* + 2(GDPi - y*)½ + 3(GDPi - 2y*)⅓ +… 
This formula creates a concave step function to represent the diminishing marginal utility of 
income. The formula for HDI’s income component remained unchanged until 1994, when a new 
method of arriving at the Atkinson-formula thresholds was introduced, along with the 
explanation that: 
It was always questionable, however, whether the poverty level of industrial countries was an 
appropriate income target for developing countries. So, for the 1994 HDI, the threshold value 
has been taken to be the current average global value of real GDP per capita in PPP$. Once a 
country gets beyond the world average, any further increases in per capita income are 
considered to make a sharply diminishing marginal contribution to human development. The 
HDI emphasizes sufficiency rather than satiety. On the new basis of real GDP per capita, the 
threshold is $5,120. (UNDP 1994: 91) 
 
The Atkinson specification of income in the HDI was a popular target for critics, who 
condemned it for its discontinuity and recommended a more uniform transformation over the 
whole range of income.24 The rejection of a cap on the un-discounted income is explained by 
Sager and Najam (1998: 253-4) in this way:25
The overall application of the GDP adjustment artificially depresses the relative affluence for 
wealthy nations so that the gap between the rich and poor countries seems much narrower than 
it actually is. The result is that the standard-of-living index presents a falsely equitable picture 
of a world which in fact is more inequitable than ever…As long as it is below that threshold the 
focus is on ensuring survival and not on adding to human development. 
Ravallion (1997) offers a deconstruction of the Atkinson method and critiques it in terms of its 
“implicit trade-offs,” that is, the terms under which countries can do well and poorly on differing 
indicators and end up with the same HDI score. He gives the example that $99 was equal to one 
year of life for countries with GDP per capita below the income threshold; at two-times the 
threshold, this value was $7,482; at three-times the threshold, $31,631; and at four-times the 
threshold, $65,038. Like Sager and Najam, Ravallion (1997: 633) sees these trade-offs as having 
an ethical content:  
In terms of both absolute dollar values and the rate of GDP growth needed to make up for lower 
longevity, the construction of the HDI assumes that life is far less valuable in poor countries that 
in rich ones; indeed, it would be nearly impossible for a rich country to make up for even one 
year less of life on average through economic growth, but relatively easy for a poor country. 
HDR 1993 (UNDP 1993: 110) includes a discussion of the problem of implicit weights in which 
the UNDP cautions against this sort of interpretation:  
It would be tempting to interpret the relative coefficients as trade-offs, but a note of caution 
should be introduced. Superficially, it would be easy to say that one extra year of life expectancy 
is “worth” $150 of income, but these are not choices open to an optimizing economic agent. 
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Take a poor country with per capita income as high as $1,500…An extra year of life expectancy 
(above a median value of about 50 years) would be the same as 10% growth in real per capita 
income. Neither of these two outcomes is likely in the short run, nor are they independent of 
each other in the real world. Thus, it would be wrong to interpret the coefficients as reflecting a 
“menu of policy choices.” 
In 1999, the UNDP switched to the current income specification in the HDI, with its continuous 
natural logarithm transformation26 and high cap of $40,000.27 HDR 1999 (UNDP 1999: 159) 
lists three advantages of this new formula: the discounting is less severe; all levels of income are 
discounted uniformly; and middle-income countries receive recognition for increases in income 
that, under the Atkinson formula, would have been very heavily discounted.  
Redundancy 
The final category of critiques of HDI is redundancy. Various authors have suggested that the 
indicators in the HDI are highly correlated and that the HDI offers no new information beyond 
that readily available in GDP per capita. 28 Kelley (1991: 322), for example, begins by agreeing 
with HDR 1990 on the essential differences between HDI to GNP per capita and (see Figure 2, 
which reproduces a graph of the HDI versus GDP per capita from HDR 1990 updated with 2003 
data from HDR 2005), but then plots HDI against log income per capita (see Figure 3, which 
reproduces Kelley’s graph with updated data), and concludes that, “The notable disparity 
between HDI and GNP/N, as highlighted in the HDR, vanishes. Indeed, log GNP/N appears to 
represent a reasonable approximation to the HDI.”29
In presenting this critique, Kelley uses the same strange graphing technique employed by the 
UNDP as shown in Figure 2: countries are put in order of their HDI and GNP per capita values, 
respectively, and then lines are drawn through all of the points for each measure thus ordered. 
This is to say that a vertical line drawn at any position in Figures 2 or 3 will touch on two points 
(one in each line) representing two different countries! The idea that conformity in the  
shape of one line to the other represents close correlation is simply incorrect.30 This graphing 
technique is central to Kelley’s conclusion that HDI is redundant.  
In contrast, Figure 4 plots HDI against GDP per capita using HDI ranks to order both sets of data 
(so that a vertical line passes through two points that each represent the same country), and 
Figure 5 uses the same procedure to graph HDI and log GDP per capita. The difference – 
comparing Figures 2 and 4, and 3 and 5, respectively – is remarkable. A final technically correct, 
although less dramatic, way to graph the relationship between HDI and GDP per capita is as a 
scatterplot (see Figures 6 and 7). In Figure 6, countries with income per capita greater than 
$10,000 seem to display a positive correlation between HDI and income per capita. As GDP per 
capita increases, so does HDI, and vice versa. Figure 7 shows a similar relationship between HDI 
and log GDP per capita throughout the income range, but the wide field of plotted points is not 
consistent with the idea that all of the information in HDI could be expressed with GDP per  
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capita or log GDP per capita. HDI provides additional, more nuanced information about human 
well-being. 
Conclusions 
The UNDP has been exceptionally receptive to criticism regarding poor data, incorrect choice of 
indicators, and poor specification of HDI overall and of HDI’s income component in particular. 
On some points, HDI has been changed significantly in response to its critics: changes to the 
education and income indices, for example. On other points, improved arguments have been 
incorporated justifying the existing HDI formula. With regards to the final category of critiques, 
redundancy, the UNDP has disagreed with its critics and has maintained HDI as the central focus 
of all 15 HDRs. At the same time, the UNDP has lived up to the promise made in early HDRs, 
that, “The HDI should be seen as evolving and improving rather than as something cast in stone. 
It is also an exercise in which as many of its users as possible should actively participate.” 
(UNDP 1993: 104) 
HDI has played two key roles in the field of applied development economics: 1) as a tool to 
popularize human development as a new understanding of well-being, and 2) as an alternative to 
GDP per capita as a way to measure levels of development for comparison across both countries 
and time. The importance of these dual roles cannot be over emphasized. HDI, as reported in the 
HDRs along with its companion indicators, makes it possible for policy-makers and development 
professionals world-wide to gauge both moments and trends in the progress of human 
development and to tailor public action to suit current and future social and economic conditions. 
Still, in praising HDI, it is important to recall that its strength originates, at least in part, from not 
being a static measure, and instead being allowed to improve over time. Further revisions can 
continue to refine HDI in the future, to correct technical problems as they come to light, and to 
permit HDI to evolve towards the best possible measure of human capabilities and human 
development.  
As an example of a possible important revision to HDI it may be recalled that, while the UNDP’s 
path-breaking work in bringing quantitative measures of human development to scholars, 
development professionals, policy-makers, and the general public has changed the field of 
international development for the better, its original vision of human development included 
distribution of capabilities across each nation. If the UNDP (1990: 12) ignored distribution in the 
original operationalization of HDI, it did so only for a lack of data: “The case is strong for 
making distributional corrections in one form or another.” For some aspects of distribution – 
notably gender-based inequality and income inequality – these data now exist. For other aspects, 
the data have yet to be developed, but to the extent that demand drives supply in measurement 
tools, to let the absence of such data be an excuse for excluding measures of inequality would be 
unfortunate.  
The existence of inequality in well-being can be addressed either by changes to HDI or by the 
addition of new inequality-related companion measures to the HDRs. These types of revisions 
have excellent potential as future steps in the continued improvement of human development 
measurement. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 An exception would be Marshall’s short-term and long-term (Ackerman 1997a). 
2 Bread and opera tickets were the examples used by Robbins. It was also Robbins who first 
defined economics as the relationship between ends and scarce means (Cooter and Rappoport 
1984). 
3 In addition, the macro-level application of the “potential Pareto improvement” criterion rests on 
the restrictive assumption that the prices by which the components of national income are 
aggregated would not be affected by redistribution. Yet we know, for example, that redistribution 
from rich to poor would diminish demand for luxuries and increase demand for necessities, 
potentially altering their relative prices and thus the “size” of the national income pie. 
4 Rawls’ two principles of justice are quoted here from Sen (1992), where they are updated from 
Rawls (1971) based on Rawls subsequent speeches, writings, and correspondence. 
5 Sen writes that “[O]f course, it is clear that emphasizing positive freedom (i.e. a person being 
actually able to do this or be that), and the duty to help others in that respect as well, could 
strengthen the relevance of ethical considerations in the determination of actual behaviour. Moral 
acceptance of rights (especially rights that are valued and supported, and not just respected in the 
form of constraints) may call for systematic departures from self-interested behaviour. Even a 
partial and limited move in that direction in actual conduct can shake the behavioural 
foundations of standard economic theory.”(1987a: 57) 
6 For further discussion see, Robeyns (2005) and Crocker (1992, 1995). 
7 See Kuznets (1947), Nordhaus and Tobin (1973), Hicks and Streeten (1979), Morris (1979), 
Ram (1982), Daly and Cobb (1989), UNDP (1990), Slottje (1991), Haq (1999), and Sen (2000a). 
8 As quoted in UNDP 1999: 23. 
9 For a discussion of changes in the HDI from 1990 to 2000 see Bhatnagar (2001). 
10 On civil and political liberties, see Hopkins 1991, Dasgupta 1993, Atkinson et al. 1997, and 
Dar 2004; on inequality, see Chowdhury 1991, Hicks 1997, and Chatterjee 2005; on the 
environment, see Paul 1996, Atkinson et al. 1997, Sager and Najam 1998, and Dar 2004; and on 
educational measures, see Kelley 1991. 
11 See Chowdhury 1991, Hopkins 1991, Kelley 1991, Ogwang 1994, and Sager and Najam 1998. 
12 See Kelley 1991, Rao 1991, Tabold-Nübler 1991, Dasgupta 1993, McGillivray and White 
1993, Aturupane et al. 1994, Doessel and Gounder 1994, UNDP 1994, Paul 1996, Noorbakhsh 
1998a; see also, Sen 1981. 
13 See also, Rao 1991. 
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14 See also, Hopkins 1991. 
15 See Kelley 1991, and Atkinson et al. 1997. 
16 If, for example, the maximum value in calculating the H Index were set at ten years above the 
actual maximum, but the maximum used in the LIT Index were set to the actual maximum, then 
the highest H Index value would be much lower than the highest LIT Index value (assuming that 
they have roughly equal means and standard deviation). See also, Hicks and Streeten 1979. 
17 See also, Noorbakhsh 1998a and 1998b. 
18 See also, Ravallion 1997, Sager and Najam 1998, and Panigrahi and Sivramkrishna 2002. 
19 See also UNDP 1991; Slottje 1991; Dasgupta and Weale 1992; Dasgupta 1993; Aktinson, et 
al. 1997; Noorkbakhsh 1998b; Panigrahi and Sivramkrishna 2002. 
20 See UNDP 1993, Noorkbakhsh 1998b, Palazzi and Lauri 1998, Biswas and Caliendo 2001, 
and Cahill 2002. 
21 Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and United States. 
22 See Kelley 1991, Acharya and Wall 1994, Srinivasan 1994, Paul 1996, and Noorbakhsh 
1998a. 
23 See Kelley 1991, Rao 1991, and McGillivray and White 1993. 
24 See McGillivray and White 1993, Ravallion 1997, Sager and Najam 1998, Bardhan and 
Klasen 1999, and Lüchters and Menkhoff 2000. Exceptions to this are Trabold-Nübler (1991) 
and Bhatnagar (2001); they both critique the Atkinson-type formula not for its discontinuity, but 
for its failure to conform strictly to diminishing returns. Bhatnagar recommends a different step 
function for utility that would exhibit diminishing returns more accurately (2001; 2002). 
25 See also Gormely (1995). 
26 Natural logs represent a change from the HDR 1990 use of base 10 logs to discount income, 
but the base of the log in this formula is actually irrelevant: any base will return the same 
resultant GDP Index. Acharya and Wall (1994) proposed an alternative HDI that includes 
discounting income by natural logs, and they incorrectly justify this by claiming that the 
transformation using natural logs is less severe than that of base 10 logs. While it is true that 
natural logs provide a less severe discounting method than base 10 logs, this difference is erased 
when the GDP Index (using either the 1990 or the 1999 formula) is used. Dividing the log of X 
by the log of Y will always result in Z, regardless of the base of the logs. This is the “change of 
base formula” in reverse: logax = logbx/logba. 
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27 $40,000 did not effectively act as a cap on income until 2001, when Luxembourg became the 
first country to have a GDP per capita greater than the cap – $42,769. To date, Luxembourg is 
the only country to which this cap is or has been applied in HDI. 
28 See Chowdhury 1991, Kelley 1991, McGillivray 1991, Dasgupta 1993, McGillivray and 
White 1993, Ogwang 1994, Srinivasan 1994, and Islam 1995; see also, Hicks and Streeten 1979. 
For a technical discussion of arbitrariness and robustness in multi-dimensional poverty measures 
in general, see Qizilbash 2004. 
29 Both Kelley’s critique and the original Figure 1.2 from HDR 1990, used GNP per capita, not 
GDP per capita. HDI has been calculated using GDP throughout its history. One data adjustment 
has been made from the UNDP data for 2003: HDR 2005 includes HDI values for Libya and 
Myanmar but omits these countries per capita GDPs; the missing values were replaced with GDP 
per capita from HDR 2004.  
30 McGillivray and White make a similar critique of this type analysis as it is used in HDR 1990. 
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